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IS THE COURT OF APPEAL DECISION IN THE 
ACHILLEAS GOOD LAW? 
 
Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc The Achilleas 




In September 2007 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the 
Commercial Court in Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc The 
Achilleas. The case relates to the assessment of damages where late redelivery 
under a time charterparty causes the vessel to miss the cancellation date for 
the next fixture. The Commercial Court had earlier held that where a time 
charterparty had no unusual provisions or features and the time charterer fails 
to redeliver the vessel in time for its next fixture, leading to a loss of profit in 
the next fixture, the shipowner’s claim for damages based on that loss of 
profits against the redelivering charterer was not too remote, being a not 
“unlikely result” of late redelivery. This decision had come as a surprise to the 
shipping industry, especially amongst charterers.  
 
THE ACHILLEAS – FACTS 
 
In January 2003 Mercator Shipping time chartered their vessel The 
Achilleas to Transfield for a period of five to seven months at the rate of 
US$13,500 per day, with the option to extend for a further period. The 
charterparty was extended for a further period of the same duration with a 
revised rate of US$16,450 per day. The latest date for redelivery of the vessel 
was fixed as of midnight of May 2nd 2004. The charterers gave a notice of 
redelivery on April 20th. The shipowners fixed the vessel for a four to six-
month period charter, on April 21st with Cargill, in anticipation of such 
redelivery. The rate was fixed at the then prevailing market rate of US$39,500 
per day, with a laycan of April 28th to May 8th, in other words Cargill had the 
right to cancel the agreement if the vessel had not been redelivered by 8th 
May.  
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By late April it became apparent that the vessel was not going to be 
redelivered by the agreed date, and the shipowners negotiated an extension 
with Cargill of their cancellation date to 1st May. In return, the shipowners 
were constrained to reduce the hire charges by US$8,000 per day. In the 
intervening period there was a substantial fall in the dry market. The 
charterers redelivered the vessel to Cargill on May 11th, with a delay of 9 
days. The charter to Cargill lasted for 191 days. The shipowners claimed a 
sum of US$1,364,584, for the loss of profit on the Cargill fixture, on the 
grounds of breach of contract in failing to redeliver by 2nd May, and in the 
alternative, US$158,301.17 which was the difference in the market rate of hire 
and the contractual rate of hire for the period of the overrun. The charterers 
maintained that the shipowners were only entitled to damages relating to the 
overrun period, which was agreed at around US$158,000. The charterers 
further contended that they could not be made responsible for the loss suffered 
by the shipowners in the charterparty with Cargill.  
 The dispute was referred to arbitration and the arbitrators awarded the 
higher amount to the shipowners. Both the High Court and the Court of 
Appeal upheld the award of the arbitrators and the reasons behind the same. 
 The principle submission of the charterers before the Court of Appeal was 
that the measure of damages for late redelivery of a time chartered vessel 
should, for reasons of authority and principle, in the absence of any special 
knowledge of a subsequent fixture, be limited to loss of current market value 
during the overrun period, that the arbitrators and the judge at first instance 
had misapplied the rule laid down in Hadley v Baxendale1 and that the losses 
claimed in respect of the Cargill fixture were too remote. In support of the 
above contention the charterers argued that the shipowners' transactions with 
a third party were res inter alios acta (a thing done between others) about 
which they did not have any knowledge at the time of contracting in 2003. 
Further, the charterers could not challenge the majority arbitrators’ findings of 
fact before the Court of Appeal. The charterers argued that any loss sustained 
by the shipowners' was simply too remote in the absence of any specific 
information being brought to the charterers’ attention before contracting and 
that limiting damages to the difference in rates for the period of the overrun 
was a matter of principle or policy, as applying any other rule would lead to 
uncertainty. 
1 Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch. 341. Here, a mill in Gloucester had to remain 
idle due to delays caused by the defendant carriers in delivering a broken crankshaft 
to the repairers in Greenwich. The mill operator claimed for loss of profit as a result 
of the delays. The claim was rejected, as the defendant carriers were not fully aware 
of the facts to "show reasonably that the profits of the mill must be stopped by an 
unreasonable delay in the delivery of the broken shaft by the carriers to the third 
person" (Alderson B at 355).    
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The Court of Appeal held that both the arbitration panel and the Judge at 
first instance had correctly determined that the shipowners were entitled to 
recover damages relating to the loss of fixture. The Court of Appeal observed 
that the charterers knew (a) it was very likely that owners had entered into a 
new fixture upon re-delivery of the vessel by them and (b) were fully aware of 
the volatility of the chartering market and the effect of late re-delivery on hire 
rates and held that damages were not too remote to be recoverable and was 
within the Hadley v Baxendale principle.  
The Court of Appeal in reaching its decision reviewed the position of law 
relating to illegitimate last voyages in a time charter and the development of 
the implication of a reasonable time within which the vessel must be 
redelivered, referring to the observations of Lord Mustill in The Gregos.2 Rix 
LJ confirmed that irrespective of whether the last voyage was legitimate or 
illegitimate, the charterers would be in breach if the final redelivery date, 
inferred from the wording of the charterparty, were to be missed by the 
charterers. The Court of Appeal referred to cases relied on by the charterers 
which included Grey & Co v Christie & Co,3 The Dione,4 The Black Falcon,5 
The Peonia6 and The London Explorer.7 The case in The Peonia was one 
where damages were awarded for late redelivery after a legitimate last 
voyage.    
Rix LJ observed, in particular, that none of the earlier cases was the 
recoverability of damages for the loss of a subsequent fixture actually in issue. 
This observation very nearly summed up the reasoning for the granting a 
judgment favouring the shipowners. The Court went on to hold that the 
Hadley v Baxendale test was to be applied as a composite whole and not as 
two separate set of tests and that the defaulting party should reasonably have 
contemplated that the result for which it seeks compensation was not unlikely. 
Commenting on the issue Rix LJ observed as follows: 
 
2 Torvald Klaveness AS v Arni Maritime Corporation (The Gregos) [1995] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep 1. Lord Mustill in his judgment had discussed and highlighted the conflicting 
interests of the parties to a time charter, especially in relation to illegitimate last 
voyages while the contract was nearing completion. 
3 Grey & Co v Christie & Co (1889) 5 TLR 577. 
4 Alma Shipping Corp of Monrovia v Mantovani (The Dione) [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
115 (CA). 
5 The Shipping Corporation of India v NSB Niederelbe Schiffahrtsgesellschaft GmbH 
& Co (The Black Falcon) [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 77. 
6 Hyundai Merchant Marine Co Ltd v Gesuri Chartering Co Ltd (The Peonia)  [1991] 
1 Lloyd's Rep 100 (CA). 
7 London & Overseas Freights Ltd v Timber Shipping Co SA (The London Explorer) 
[1971] 1 Lloyd's Rep 523. 
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“The refixing of the vessel at the end of the charterers’ charter was not 
merely ‘not unlikely’ it was in truth highly probable (barring other 
possibilities).”8  
 
On the issue of remoteness, the court concluded that where a result is 
foreseeable as a substantial possibility, but happens only in a small minority 
of cases and would therefore be very unusual and not been in the parties 




The judgment while stating the law raises a few questions for the shipping 
industry and the lawyer alike. In particular, a) if a legitimate last voyage 
overruns, are the charterers in breach of the contract and liable to pay 
damages limited only by ‘remoteness’ and b) Is it commercially reasonable 
that owners be able to recover for the loss of a following fixture when time 
charterers redeliver late? 
The case of Hadley v Baxendale is still the leading authority on the issue 
of damages recoverable by an innocent party following a breach of contact. 
The damages that a claimant may recover for breach of a contract under the 
principles set out in the above case may be summarised as a) may fairly and 
reasonably be considered either arising naturally, ie, according to the usual 
course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or b) such as may 
reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at 
the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it. 
While ordering a retrial of the case in Hadley v Baxendale, Alderson B, 
delivering the judgment for the court, observed as follows:  
 
“Now, if the special circumstances under which the contract was 
actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, 
and thus known to both parties, the damages resulting from the breach 
of such a contract, which they would reasonably contemplate, would 
be the amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach 
of contract under these special circumstances so known and 
communicated. But, on the other hand, if these special circumstances 
were wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at the 
most, could only be supposed to have had in his contemplation the 
amount of injury which would arise generally, and in the great 
multitude of cases not affected by any special circumstances, from 
such a breach of contract. For, had the special circumstances been 
8 Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc (The Achilleas) [2007] 2 Lloyds 
Rep 555 at 574. 
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known, the parties might have specially provided for the breach of 
contract by special terms as to the damages in that case; and of this 
advantage it would be very unjust to deprive them.”9
 
In Victoria Laundry case10 the Court of Appeal expressed the opinion that 
the headnote to Hadley v Baxendale was definitely misleading in so far as it 
stated that the defendant carriers’ clerk was told that the mill had stopped and 
the crank shaft had to be delivered immediately to the repairers. If the court in 
Hadley v Baxendale had actually regarded the facts as having been 
established, then it was “reasonably plain” from Alderson B’s opinion in 
Hadley v Baxendale that it would have decided that case “the other way 
round.”  
The charterers in support of their argument that the losses claimed in 
respect of the Cargill fixture were too remote, sought to place such losses 
under the second head of the Hadley v Baxendale test. Their principle 
contention being that the Cargill fixture could not have been in the 
contemplation of the parties at the time of entering into the contract.    
The House of Lords in The Heron II11 set out the guidelines on the 
application of the rule in Hadley v Baxendale. Lord Reid in his judgment 
referring to the test in Hadley v Baxendale summarised it as being one where 
the loss in question is: 
 
“of a kind which the defendant, when he made the contract, ought to 
have realised was not unlikely to result from breach… the words ‘not 
unlikely’ denoting a degree of probability considerably less than an 
even chance but nevertheless not very unusual and easily 
foreseeable.”12  
 
In The Achilleas, the charterers knew that it was very likely that the 
shipowners had entered into a new fixture upon redelivery of the vessel by 
them and were fully aware of the volatile chartering market and any effects 
the redelivery may have on hire rates. The above facts would apparanently fall 
within the principles laid down in The Heron II, as the damages were not too 
remote to be recoverable and also within the Hadley v Baxendale principle. 
9 Above n 1, at 355. 
10 Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd [1949] 2 KB 528, 537 
(CA). 
11 Czarnikow (c) Ltd v Koufos (The Heron II) [1969] 1 AC 350. It was a case where 
the charterers successfully claimed damages for late delivery of sugar as a result of 
breach of obligations on the part of the shipowners. The charterers claimed the 
difference in the market price of sugar at the time of actual delivery and the higher 
price the cargo of sugar would have fetched had it arrived in time.   
12 Above n 10, at 391. 
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While discussing the issue of late redelivery in a time charter Rix LJ had 
pointed out that it was The Peonia that first recognised that damages were 
indeed available for late delivery upon a legitimate last voyage and that a loss 
of fixture could only rarely occur.13 In The Peonia, the terms of the 
charterparty defined the charter period as “about minimum 10 months 
maximum 12 months time charter. Exact duration in charterers’ option. 
Charterers have further option to complete last voyage”. The shipowners 
treating the final voyage orders as being illegitimate, requested for a revised 
order, or in the alternative for a higher rate of hire for the duration of the 
proposed final voyage which fell outside the charter period.14 The shipowners 
were constrained to terminate the chartering contract as the charterers refused 
to go by either of the alternatives and the dispute was referred to arbitration. 
Both the Commercial Court and the Court of Appeal disagreed with the 
arbitrators and held that the expression “further option” only related to a 
legitimate last voyage and that the owners were right in their actions.15 The 
Court of Appeal, before reaching the above conclusion, had the occasion to 
analyse the position at common law and the existing jurisprudence. Earlier, in 
The London Explorer the House of Lords was divided on the issue if it would 
amount to a breach when the vessel sent out on a legitimate last voyage was 
unexpectedly delayed beyond the charter's final delivery date.  
In The Baleares16 the Court of Appeal, while assessing a claim brought by 
charterers referred to the factual findings of the arbitrators17 on the knowledge 
13 “As for the consequences of an illegitimate last voyage, the cases demonstrate that 
they may vary more widely, and also indicate that, for one reason or another, a loss of 
fixture claim could rarely occur.” Above, n 8, at 566. 
14 The charter period was to expire on 11 June 1988 but in early May the charterers 
ordered the vessel on a final voyage, which was not expected to be complete before 
19 July. 
15 It is to be noted that The Peonia did not involve any issue of the loss of any 
subsequent fixture by the shipowners. 
16 Geogas SA v Trammos Gas Ltd [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep 215 (CA). Here the Court of 
Appeal upheld the findings of an arbitration tribunal that the shipowners' of a gas 
carrier were liable for losses suffered by the charterers from forward contracts as a 
result of late delivery of the vessel which deprived the charterers of buying the 
requisite quantity of propane needed to service their forward contracts.       
17 Lord Neill delivering judgment observed as follows: “…The arbitrators referred to 
the fact that a carrier in this specialised trade would know a considerable amount 
about the pattern of trading of the product which he was carrying. It seems to me that 
it is implicit in the arbitrators’ conclusion that, though the owners had no knowledge 
of the existence or terms of specific trades or specific contracts made by the 
charterers, they must have realised that it was not unlikely that the charterers would 
have made forward sales at fixed prices. I recognise that in The “Heron II” Lord 
Upjohn…emphasised that the knowledge of a carrier of goods may be limited and less 
than that of a seller of goods. In the present case, however, the arbitrators were 
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that a shipowner may or may not posses about the pattern of trading in 
specific trades or specific contracts made by the charterers. It is to be noted 
that in the absence of any error of law, the courts are bound by the factual 
findings of the arbitrators on remoteness, as illustrated by The Baleares. The 
claims made by the charterers in both The Heron II and The Baleares relate to 
losses arising in forward contracts. The Baleares, although relevant, was not 




Where charterers redelivered the vessel late, it had been held that in 
addition to paying hire charges for the extended period of time, the charterers 
were also required to pay damages to the shipowner which is the difference 
between the charter rate and the market rate for such extended period if in the 
event the marke rate was greater. The Achilleas presents a scenario where, in 
the event of the charterers redelivering the vessel late would be liable to pay 
much more in damages if the ship owner had entered into a new fixture and if 
it is reasonably foreseeable that such future employment would be 
compromised by late re-delivery. The above conclusion was reached by the 
Court of Appeal based on the principles laid down in the earlier cases of The 
Heron II and The Peonia. 
Earlier, Lord Dennning MR, in The Dione, relying on an the decision of 
the House of Lords,18 had held that when delays are caused in the legitimate 
last voyage, due to no fault of the parties, the charterparty would be presumed 
to be in operation until the end of the final voyage, regardless of the fact it 
may extend beyond the charter period. He further observed that in such 
instance the hire payable was only at the charter rate until redelivery, whether 
the market had gone up or down.  
The Court of Appeal in The Achilleas did refer to the decision in The 
Dione, in particular to the judgment of Lord Denning MR, before reaching its 
conclusion. The Court was also quick to point out that it was not until The 
Peonia19 that it became clear that a legitimate last voyage could result in a 
breach of contract if it overran the charterparty contract.20 In contrast the facts 
 
entitled to place reliance on the specialised nature of the trade and to impute to a 
carrier a greater knowledge of the relevant market than might have been appropriate 
in different circumstances.”  
18 Timber Shipping Co SA v London & Overseas Freighters Ltd [1971] 1 Lloyd's Rep 
523. 
19 Above n 6. 
20 “…it was only finally in 1991 that it became clear that an overrunning legitimate 
last voyage could result in a breach of contract. Up to then, it had been assumed that 




of The Gregos presented a completely different picture where the parties 
entered into a without prejudice agreement to pay a certain amount as 
compensation for any overrunning of the charterparty terms. One should also 
bear in mind that there was no claim for loss of any subsequent fixture in 
issue in The Peonia. 
Unlike in the case of The Dione, the issue before the Court of Appeal in 
The Achilleas was not one to ascertain the legitimacy or otherwise of a last 
voyage in a time charter, but if the shipowners would be justified and entitled 
to demand the losses that they may occasion from a lost fixtures in the event a 
legitimate last voyage overran. On the facts presented, the Court of Appeal 
had handed down a judgment stating that i. in such instances a shipowner 
could in fact claim damages relating to loss of fixture, as the charterers knew 
that ii. it was very likely that the shipowners had entered into a new fixture 
upon redelivery of the vessel, that the charterers iii. had full knowledge of the 
volatility of the market and its effect on the hire rates and iv. the damages 
were, accordingly, not too remote to be recoverable and was within the 
principle laid down in Hadley v Baxendale.   
One could argue that the loss would not have been foreseeable in the 
instant case and the shipowners could not have been successful, but for the 
shipowners having a safety margin in their contract and the charterers having 
knowledge of the volatility of the market and the hire rates. The shipowners 
had, indeed, allowed for a safety margin between the latest possible 
contractual date for redelivery and the commencement date of the next fixture.  
The important question that we ask is if the judgment varies the existing law 
as regards damages for redelivery under a time charterparty? The answer 
would be in the negative, as it only affirms and adds to the existing authorities 
on the subject. In all the previous cases it had been held that in the event the 
vessel was redelivered late, the charterers were liable to pay damages 
calculated on the difference between the charter rate and the market rate for 
the extended period, in the event the market rate was higher. Further, the 
question of loss of future employment of the vessel did not arise in the 
previous cases.  
It is to be noted that the Court of Appeal did not think its judgment would 
lead to any confusion in the highly commercial shipping industry and made 
the following observation:   
 
“Business-like communication and cooperation between parties to a 
charter ought to make a dangerous mishap an unusual event… It 
requires extremely volatile conditions to create the situation which 
occurred here. If the shipping industry nevertheless feels that it cannot 
live with this result, clauses can be created to regulate the situation: 
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just as clauses have come into being to regulate last voyages, such as 
Baltime Clause 7 and Shelltime 4 Clause 19.”21
 
In the light of the observations of the Court of Appeal in The Achilleas the 
time charterers will need to be much more careful in how they word their 
charterparty contracts and also in complying with their contractual duties as 
regards redelivery of the vessel to avoid paying out any large sums as 
damages. Following the judgment, where a shipowner had entered into a new 
fixture and if it were reasonably foreseeable that the future employment of the 
vessel would be put at risk by any late redelivery by the charterer, the 
damages that the charterer might be liable to pay would be much greater.  It is 
the view of the author that this judgment will provide the template for the 
application of the principle that a shipowner would be within his rights to 
claim damages for the loss occasioned on the subsequent fixture as a result of 




21 Above n 8, at 578 
